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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DANIAL PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20010211-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State hereby submits 
this brief in reply to appellee's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
In his brief, "Peterson concedes that the trial court correctly tolled the period between 
September 8,2001, when Peterson filed a motion to reconsider, and October 27,2000, when 
the trial court denied that motion-a total of 49 days . . . ." Aple. Brf. at 10-11. He also 
"concedes that the trial court abused its discretion under [State v.] Coleman[, 2001 UT App 
281,431 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,] in failing to toll the disposition period between August 10, and 
August 21,2000—a total of 11 days." Aple. Brf. at 10. Therefore, the issue before the Court 
1 
is whether the trial court erred in refusing to toll the 31 -day period between July 10,2000 and 
August 10, 2000—the time required to accommodate Peterson's motion to suppress.1 
In Coleman, this Court acknowledged that a defendant's "[mjotion to [s]uppress 
toll[s] the 120-day time period because the motion [i]s a delay caused by [defendant." 2001 
UT App 281, at ^ 8. Peterson contends that although he represented to the trial court his 
intention to file a motion to suppress on July 7, 2000, the resulting delay should not be 
attributed to him until August 10, 2000—the day he filed the motion. Aple. Brf. at 11-13. 
However, as the State argued in its brief, Aplt. Brf. at 10, "the disposition period [is] 
extended by the amount of time during which defendant himself has created delay." State 
v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982); accord State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 
(Utah 1998).2 Delay attributable to a defendant thus does not necessarily turn on when he 
files a motion, but rather on when his actions create delay. 
Following the preliminary hearing, Peterson advised the court that he intended to file 
motions dispositive of the case. R. 153: 33-34. To accommodate Peterson, the trial court did 
1
 Peterson also contends that pursuant to Coleman, this Court should reject the 
State's alternative claim that at best, only the methamphetamine charge should have been 
dismissed. Aple. Brf. at 20. However, Coleman fs "resolution of the first issue obviate[d] 
[its] need to reach [that] issue," and its comments in footnote 5 of the opinion are 
therefore dicta. See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, at 1 5 n.5. 
2Thus, Peterson's contention, Aple. Brf. at 11, that the State's brief was inadequate 
because it did not cite to any authority supporting the proposition that the disposition 
period should be tolled before the filing of a motion lacks merit. Citing Velasquez and 
He at on, the State argued that the proceedings were delayed to accommodate Peterson's 
motion. See Aplt. Brf. at 10-12. Citation to a case addressing the exact issue before the 
appellate court is not required, and in many cases, not possible. 
2 
not set a trial date, but imposed a motion schedule, giving Peterson three weeks to file his 
motion, the State two weeks to respond, and Peterson another week to file a reply. R. 153: 
35-36. Oral argument was set three days later. R. 153: 36. This delay was wholly 
attributable to Peterson. But for Peterson's decision to file the motion, trial would have been 
set and "nothing in the record indicates that the State could not have brought [defendant's 
matter to trial within the required time." See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, at f 11. As such, 
"there is no 'reasonable basis in the record to support' the trial court's determination that 
'good cause' did not excuse the prosecution for its failure to bring the matter to trial" before 
the February trial date. See id (citations omitted).3 
In support of his contention that the entire motion period should not be tolled, 
Peterson points to the fact that the Supreme Court in Heaton "did not toll the period between 
Heaton's request for a preliminary hearing on August 30 and the actual date of the 
preliminary hearing on September 9." Aple. Brf. at 12-13. Heaton does not support 
Peterson's contention. Four of the ten days were not attributed to Heaton because he did not 
file a disposition demand until September 3. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. The remaining six 
days were not attributed to Heaton because the September 9 preliminary hearing date was 
originally scheduled as the trial date. See id. In other words, those six days were already 
3Peterson also contends that because the State did not remind the district court, in 
responding to the motion to dismiss, that Peterson had previously represented in a pretrial 
conference that "he's not filing a 120-day disposition [demand]," the State's good cause 
argument in that regard, Aplt. Brf. at 13-15, is waived. See Aple. Brf. at 14-15. 
However, the State did argue that good cause justified the delay in the proceedings. See 
R. 99-104. Accordingly, the State preserved its claim that good cause justified the delay 
and may rely on those facts in the record which support that claim. 
3 
attributable to the State. Heaton was charged with the resulting 18-delay in the proceedings 
caused by his tardy request for a preliminary hearing. Id. Likewise, here, Peterson should 
be charged with the resulting delay in the proceedings that was required to accommodate his 
motion to suppress.4 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those identified in the State's opening brief, the State 
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial court's order dismissing the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this \3~ day of December, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEfp&EY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
^ ^ ^ 
4Moreover, a preliminary hearing is not of the same nature as a motion to suppress. 
Absent an express waiver, the court must hold a preliminary hearing. Utah R. Crim. P. 
7(g). Accordingly, unlike a motion to suppress, the period of delay created by a 
preliminary hearing does not toll the 120-day disposition period. See Coleman, 2001 UT 
App 281, at ffl[ 8, 14 (attributing to defendant delay resulting from motion to suppress, but 
not delay resulting from preliminary hearing). 
4 
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